On July 29, 2026, Judge Brian Stagner of the Texas Business Court’s Eighth Division addressed when derived judicial immunity protects a court-appointed receiver from civil liability and whether that protection extends to special-purpose entities the receiver creates to carry out a court-ordered sale.
Gail Corder Fischer v. Clifford R. Fischer, et al. arose from a post-divorce enforcement proceeding in Dallas County. The district court appointed Michael Newman as receiver to facilitate the sale of certain business entities. While an appeal of the receivership order remained pending, and no stay was in place, Newman proceeded with the sale, ultimately executing an equity purchase agreement through two special-purpose entities he allegedly created: Fischer Seller, LP and Fischer Purchaser Holdings, LP.
After the sale closed, the Dallas Court of Appeals reversed and vacated the receivership order, concluding it exceeded the district court’s enforcement powers under the Texas Family Code. The plaintiff then brought suit against Newman and the two entities, asserting a variety of claims, including breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, civil conspiracy, and misappropriation of trade secrets.
The Court’s Holdings
Newman was entitled to dismissal. Some Texas courts have applied a functional approach to derived judicial immunity, asking whether the court officer was acting as an arm of the court performing a function comparable to that of the delegating judge. If immunity attaches, it covers actions taken with respect to the protected function, “whether good or bad, honest or dishonest, well-intentioned or not.” The plaintiff’s own pleadings tied every allegation — structuring the sale, selecting the buyer, allocating consideration, approving bonuses, and negotiating releases — directly to Newman’s role as receiver. Because the petition contained no allegation that Newman acted outside his receivership capacity, the court dismissed all claims against him with prejudice.
The appellate reversal did not eliminate Newman’s immunity. The plaintiff argued that because the receivership order was ultimately vacated, Newman’s appointment was void from the outset. The court rejected this reasoning. For immunity purposes, the court noted that the relevant question is not whether the trial court correctly exercised jurisdiction to enter a specific order, but whether the appointing court possessed general subject-matter jurisdiction over proceedings of that kind. Because district courts generally have jurisdiction over post-divorce enforcement proceedings and hold the authority to appoint receivers, the subsequent reversal did not retroactively strip Newman of immunity.
The special-purpose entities were not entitled to dismissal. Under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 91a, a motion to dismiss based on an affirmative defense may only be granted if the plaintiff’s own pleading conclusively establishes every element of that defense. The court held that the plaintiff’s petition did not allege that either entity was appointed as a receiver or formally connected to the court’s order beyond participating in the transaction. The court noted that evidence developed later might support an immunity defense for the entities, but Rule 91a does not permit reliance on facts that have not been pleaded or on external evidence. The court denied the motion as to both entities, without prejudice to re-raising the defense on an evidentiary record.
Practical Takeaways
Individuals and entities involved in such transactions, appointments, and proceedings may wish to consider the following:
- Raise concerns during the receivership. Parties that believe a receiver has acted improperly may be better served by raising those concerns with the appointing court than pursuing civil claims after the fact. Immunity sometimes presents a hurdle to post-closing litigation against the receiver personally.
- A stay may assist an appeal. Parties challenging a receivership appointment should consider seeking a stay to preserve their ability to affect the outcome.